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Rights of HIV-Infected Employees and Job Applicants Under
North Carolina Law: Lots of Legislative Activity, But Just
How Much Protection Does It Afford?
Editor's Note: On July 26, 1990, as this issue was going to print, President George
Bush signed into law the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) discussed in foot-
note 53 below. This landmark legislation, hailed as a civil rights act for the dis-
abled, is modelled after the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 but extends
protection to the private sector. Despite legislative attempts to exclude HIV-in-
fected persons, the ADA clearly protects anyone who is disabled by the virus. How-
ever, the ADA contains a lengthy grace period for employers: the effective dates of
the various provisions range from eighteen months to four years in the future.
Although the ADA's sweeping protections eventually will go far towards alleviating
discrimination against HIV-individuals who have become disabled by the virus,
state measures are nevertheless necessary to protect those who are not yet disabled.
[W]e are fighting two fights--one against the HIV virus and one
against discrimination. We may not win the first fight until we have
won the second.1
The rapidly growing number of Americans affected by Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)2 has generated a host of questions relating to em-
ployment. As of July 1990 more than 139,000 cases of AIDS had been reported
in the United States;3 in North Carolina, there were 1,427 reported cases.4 The
United States Public Health Service currently estimates that between 650,000
and 1,400,000 Americans are infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
1. NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATrvE RESEARCH COMM'N, REP. TO THE 1989 GENERAL AS-
SEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS), at 24 (1989)
[hereinafter LEoisLArivE REP.].
2.
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is a late manifestation of infection
with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Most people infected with HIV remain
asymptomatic for long periods. HIV infection is most often diagnosed by using HIV an-
tibody tests....
The time between infection with HIV and development of AIDS ranges from a few
months to [greater than] ten years. Most people who are infected with'HIV will eventually
have some symptoms related to that infection.
Centers for Disease Control, Sexually Transmitted Disease Treatment Guidelines, 38 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter CDC Treatment Guidelines]. There is
no known vaccine or cure for AIDS. Id.
A full discussion of the epidemiology of AIDS is beyond the scope of this Note. For an excel-
lent judicial exposition of the relevant medical facts, see Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d
701 (9th Cir. 1988). For a thorough discussion of the history and demographics of the AIDS virus,
see the October 1988 issue of Scientific American magazine, which includes the following articles:
Gallo & Montagnier, AIDS in 1988, 259 Sci. AM. 41 (1988) (authored by the investigators who
discovered the HIV virus); Heyward & Curran, The Epidemiology of AIDS in the United States, 259
Sci. AM. 72 (1988); Mann, Chin, PiNot & Quinn, The International Epidemiology of AIDS, 259 SCi.
AM. 82 (1988).
3. UNITED STATES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. -
UNITED STATES 5 (Aug. 1990).
4. Id.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(HIV), the virus that causes AIDS. 5 "From the perspective of the individual
with AIDS, the syndrome is incurable, physically incapacitating, mentally
debilitating, and-finally-lethal."'6 Because the syndrome disables victims pro-
gressively, 7 AIDS and AIDS-related infection create unique problems in society
and in the workplace. Controversial questions about the rights of persons with
AIDS or HIV-infection abound, including sensitive concerns regarding testing,
confidentiality, and privacy. In the workplace, these issues are magnified, and
additional problems emerge regarding discrimination in hiring and firing, the
costs to employers in productivity, health insurance, and possible tort liability to
third parties.
Federal law prohibits discrimination against an otherwise-qualified person
on the basis of a communicable disease.8 Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilita-
tion Act 9 (the federal act) covers any federally assisted entity and federal con-
5. Estimates of HIV Prevalence and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a Workshop, October
31-November I 1989, 39 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 110, 111 (1990) [hereinafter
M.M.W.R.]; see also Heyward & Curran, supra note 2, at 80. Because HIV is the virus that causes
AIDS, all persons with AIDS are HIV-positive. See Curran, Jaffe, Hardy, Morgan, Selik &
Dondero, Epidemiology of the HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States, 239 SCIENCI 610
(1988). However, not all persons with HIV have AIDS, nor are HIV-positive persons certain to
develop full-blown AIDS. See UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME, at 11 (1986). Persons who demonstrate
some symptoms of AIDS but do not manifest the opportunistic infections that trigger an AIDS
diagnosis are classified as suffering from AIDS-Related Complex (ARC). Id. For ease of reading,
this Note will use only the terms HIV-infection and AIDS, referring to those who are asymptomatic
and those who exhibit symptoms, respectively.
Although alarming numbers are dying each year of AIDS, the focus of this Note is those who
need the protection of the law-those who are living with AIDS. In 1989 there were between 92,000
and 98,000 living persons with AIDS; by 1993 there may be as many as 225,000 persons living with
AIDS. M.M.W.R., supra, at 17. New experimental treatments have the potential to lengthen the
lifespans of HIV-infected persons. See Leonard, AIDS, Employment, and Unemployment, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 929, 930-31 (1989); LEGISLATIVE REP., supra note 1, at D-1 1 (discussing average length of
time between contracting HIV and developing AIDS).
6. W. BANTA, AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE 149 (1988).
7. Because of the indeterminable incubation period of the AIDS virus, and the various
dissimilar stages of illness associated with it, infected persons cannot all be classified as
handicapped. No bright line indicates which stage of AIDS causes physical disability in its
victims. On one hand, persons in the final stages of the disease are so disabled by the virus
they are unable to work, and therefore fall within the definition of handicapped, On the
other hand, mere carriers of the AIDS virus, or persons in the early stages of the disease
usually exhibit no disabling effects. Although members of this latter, less-afflicted class
may not appear handicapped, they suffer from equally virulent employment discrimination.
In fact, these victims may be in the greatest need of protection.
Note, Are AIDS Victims Handicapped?, 31 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 729, 739 (1987) (citations omitted), See
Heyward & Curran, supra note 2, at 81; see also LEGISLATIVE REP., supra note 1, at D-I I (average
time from infection to disease now appears to be between eight and fourteen years).
8. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285-86 (1987) (§ 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against persons with communicable diseases).
9. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). § 504 prohibits federal employ-
ers, federal contractors and programs receiving federal monies from discriminating against the hand-
icapped, and requires federal agencies and contractors to implement affirmative action for
handicapped employees. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 to -. 14 (1989) (regulations enacted to effectuate
§ 504). To benefit from the Act's protection, the person must be handicapped yet physically able to
perform the job; must not create a health or safety risk to himself or others; and any special needs
must be capable of accommodation without undue burden on his employer. Id.; see generally Weg-
ner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to
Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1984)
(discussing the scope and interpretation of § 504).
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tractors.10 Private-sector employers are restricted only by state laws. Many
states have elected to classify AIDS and HIV-positivity as a handicap and to
provide protection to victims under general handicap and disability legislation;"1
others have expressly excluded the conditions from the protection of handicap
statutes. 12 Still other states have passed AIDS-specific antidiscrimination stat-
utes. 13 North Carolina has refused to consider HIV-positive status or AIDS a
handicap. In 1989 the North Carolina General Assembly amended the Commu-
nicable Disease Law to address discrimination against persons with AIDS and
HIV-infection in employment, housing, public services, and places of public ac-
commodation. 14 While the legislation answered queries about what protection
10. Because the Federal Rehabilitation Act covers any entity to which the federal government
directly or indirectly extends financial assistance, its coverage includes executive agencies and pro-
grams, the postal service, hospitals, universities, states, and municipalities. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f)
(1989).
11. See, e.g., Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (discuss-
ing Florida Commission on Human Relations decision); Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986) (telephone company employee alleging con-
structive discharge because of AIDS stated claim under state handicap law); Raytheon Co. v. Fair
Empl. & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1989) (plaintiff
successful in AIDS-discrimination suit).
12. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.140(2)(c) (Baldwin 1982) (communicable disease
exemption to handicap law); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(c) (Supp. 1987) (same).
13. A Massachusetts statute prohibits employers from requiring HIV tests from job applicants
or current employees. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. Ill, § 70F (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
14. An Act to Amend the Communicable Disease Act, ch. 698, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 373, 374
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148 (1989)). The portion of the new law applica-
ble to employment provides:
(i) Except as provided in this section, no test for AIDS virus infection shall be re-
quired, performed or used to determine suitability for continued employment, housing or
public services, or for the use of places of public accommodation as defined in G.S. 168A-
3(8), or public transportation.
Further it shall be unlawful to discriminate against any person having AIDS virus or
HIV infection on account of that infection in determining suitability for continued employ-
ment, housing, or public services, or for the use of places of public accommodation, as
defined in G.S. 168A-3(8), or public transportation.
... Any person aggrieved by an act or discriminatory practice prohibited by this
subsection other than one relating to housing may bring a civil action to enforce rights
granted or protected by this subsection.
The action shall be commenced in superior court in the county where the alleged
discriminatory practice or prohibited conduct occurred or where the plaintiff or defendant
resides. Such action shall be tried to a court without a jury. Any relief granted by the
court shall be limited to declaratory and injunctive relief, including orders to hire or rein-
state an aggrieved person or admit such person to a labor organization.
In a civil action brought to enforce provisions of this subsection relating to employ-
ment, the court may award back pay. Any such back pay liability shall not accrue from a
date more than two years prior to the filing of an action under this subsection. Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the aggrieved person shall oper-
ate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. In any civil action brought under this
subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees to the substan-
tially prevailing party as a part of costs.
A civil action brought pursuant to this subsection shall be commenced within 180
days after the date on which the aggrieved person became aware or, with reasonable dili-
gence, should have become aware of the alleged discriminatory practice or prohibitory
conduct.
Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to prohibit an employer from:
(1) Requiring a test for AIDS virus infection for job applicants in preemployment medical
examinations required by the employer;
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AIDS victims have, many are concerned that it failed to address their demands
for full antidiscrimination protection in all facets of life.15
In Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc. 16 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina recently held that the definition of handicapped in the North Carolina
Handicapped Persons Protection Act 17 (the state act), which differs only slightly
(2) Denying employment to a job applicant based solely on a confirmed positive test for
AIDS virus infection;
(3) Including a test for AIDS virus infection performed in the course of an annual medical
examination routinely required of all employees by the employer, or
(4) Taking the appropriate employment action, including reassignment or termination of
employment, if the continuation by the employee who has AIDS virus or HIV infection of
his work tasks would pose a significant risk to the health of the employee, coworkers, or
the public, or if the employee is unable to perform the normally assigned duties of the job.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1989).
15. The North Carolina General Assembly first attempted to address through legislation the
AIDS epidemic during its 1987 session. There were nine different bills introduced during the ses-
sion, including proposals for mandatory testing, education and revisions of the communicable dis-
ease laws. See LEGIsLATIVE RP., supra note 1, at C-1. Of these, three AIDS-related bills became
law. Id. at 8. These included provisions for AIDS education in the public schools, An Act to
Provide for Instruction in the Public Schools on the Prevention of AIDS and Other Communicable
Diseases, ch. 630, § 1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1140 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 (1987))
(preventive education to be taught emphasizing parental involvement, abstinence from sex and
drugs); earlier amendments to the Communicable Disease Law, An Act to Amend the Communica-
ble Disease Law, ch. 782, § 3, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1607 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-133
(1989)) (expanding communicable disease definition to include communicable conditions so as to
cover HIV infection; proposed antidiscrimination language deleted before bill passed); and the crea-
tion of a Legislative Research Commission study of AIDS, An Act to Authorize Studies by the
Legislative Research Commission, ch. 873, § 2.1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 2188 (The Report prepared
by this Commission was presented to the 1989 Session of the General Assembly and is herein re-
ferred to as LEGIsLATivE REP.; see supra note 1).
16. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168A-1 to -12 (1987). The state act, which applies only to those
employers who have 15 or more employees, id. § 168A-3, provides in relevant part:
It is a discriminatory practice for... [a]n employer to fail to hire or consider for employ-
ment or promotion, to discharge, or otherwise discriminate against a qualified handicapped
person on the basis of a handicapping condition... [or] to require an applicant to identify
himself as handicapped prior to a conditional offer of employment ....
Id. § 168A-5(a). The state act defines a handicapped person as:
any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment. As used in this subdivision, the term:
a. "Physical or mental impairment" means (i) any physiological disorder or abnormal
condition... affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculo-
skeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; repro-
ductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine... but (iii)
excludes sexual preferences ....
b. "Major life activities" means functions such as caring for one's self, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, and learning.
c. "Has a record of such an impairment" means has a history of, or has been misclassifled
as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits major life activities.
d. "Is regarded as having such impairment" means (i) has a physical or mental impair-
ment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated as constituting
such a limitation; (ii) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major
life activities because of the attitudes of others; or (iii) has none of the impairments defined
in paragraph a. of this subdivision but is treated as having such an impairment.
Id. § 168A-3(4). For further discussion of the North Carolina act, see Note, AIDS and Employment
Discrimination: Employer Guidelines and Defenses, 23 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 305, 317-320 (1988)




from the definition in the Federal Rehabilitation Act,18 does not encompass a
person with the HIV-infection. 19 This decision had a substantial impact upon
the protections afforded HIV-infected employees of non-federally funded em-
ployers. Had the court found AIDS and HIV-infection to be a handicap under
North Carolina law, persons infected with HIV would have received the blanket
protection of the state handicap statute, and the newly amended Communicable
Disease Law would have reinforced that protection and provided a remedy to
victims of discrimination attributable to HI-infection. In North Carolina
HIV-infected persons today may claim protection from discrimination only
under the newly amended Communicable Disease Law.20
This Note presents a comprehensive overview of North Carolina employ-
ment law regarding persons with AIDS and those who test positive for the virus.
It includes an examination of the recently enacted AIDS-specific employment
provisions of the North Carolina Communicable Disease Law. It also analyzes
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc,21 in which the Supreme Court of North
Carolina recently held that an asymptomatic person is not considered handi-
capped under the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act. The
Note compares North Carolina's law with federal laws on AIDS in the work-
place, and contrasts North Carolina's legislative approach to AIDS in the em-
ployment context with measures taken by other jurisdictions. The Note
concludes with suggestions for strengthening the protections North Carolina law
affords to both asymptomatic HIV-carrier persons and persons with AIDS.
After Burgess it is clear that the newly amended Communicable Disease
Law provides the sole protection against HIV-related discrimination to North
Carolina residents not covered by the federal act.22 The degree of job protection
provided by the amendments depends on whether the aggrieved person is a cur-
rent employee or is seeking employment. The new legislation expressly prohibits
discrimination in continued employment,23 but provides that an employer is not
prohibited from denying employment to an applicant who tests positive for
HIV.24 An employer also is not prohibited from reassigning or terminating an
employee if continued employment would "pose a significant risk to the health
of the employee, co-workers, or the public, or if the employee is unable to per-
form the normally assigned duties of the job." 25
The communicable disease law prohibits blood testing for AIDS infection
as a prerequisite for continued employment.2 6 However, it does allow an em-
ployer to require a blood test for AIDS infection as part of a pre-employment
18. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
19. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 211, 388 S.E.2d at 140. The court's reading of North Carolina law
also suggests that the act does not even protect "full-blown AIDS" as a handicap. See infra text
accompanying notes 80-83.
20. See supra note 14 (relevant text of amended statute).
21. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1989). See supra note 14.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i)(2).
25. Id. § 130A-148(i)(4).
26. Id. § 130A-148(i).
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medical examination or to include a test for HIV in routine, required medical
examinations. 27 Under the statute, it is unlawful to discriminate against a per-
son with HIV on account of that infection in continued employment, housing,
public services, public accommodation, or public transportation. 28 The statute's
provision for discrimination in continued employment is essentially the "other-
wise qualified" standard used in most disability and handicap statutes. 29 How-
ever, the statute does allow discrimination against job applicants on the basis of
HIV-infection, by allowing denial of employment on the basis of a positive HIV
test.3
0
The law gives an aggrieved plaintiff the right to bring a civil action in supe-
rior court.31 The plaintiff's remedy is limited to declaratory and injunctive re-
lief, including orders to hire or reinstate, and to receive up to two years'
backpay.32 Such backpay must be offset by any interim earnings or amounts
27. Id. § 130A-148(i)(1), (3). Cf. id. § 168A-5(b)(6) (North Carolina Handicapped Persons
Protection Act mandates that an employer may require that a person undergo a medical exam to
determine person's ability to do job only if employer has made an offer of employment conditional
on meeting physical requirements and the exam is required of all persons conditionally offered the
same position regardless of handicapping condition).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i).
29. The North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act defines "qualified handicapped
person":
With regard to employment, a handicapped person who can satisfactorily perform the du-
ties of the job in question, with or without reasonable accommodation,... further provided
that the handicapping condition does not create an unreasonable risk to the safety or health
of the handicapped person, other employees, the employer's customers, or the public.
Id. § 168A-3(9). The burden is on the employer to justify the discriminatory action taken by show-
ing that the handicapped person was not otherwise qualified for the job.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i)(2) (1989). This provision was enacted despite the Legisla-
tive Commission's findings that "[tihe vast majority of HIV-positive people are healthy, functioning
members of society." LEGISLATIVE REP., supra note 1, at 9; cf. Letter from C. Everett Koop, Sur-
geon General of the Public Health Service, to Douglas Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General
(July 29, 1988), reprinted in D. Kmiec, Memorandum for Counsel to the President on the Applica-
tion of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-infected Individuals, at 4 (September 27, 1988) [here-
inafter Koop Letter]. Ironically, the sponsor of the new antidiscrimination law, Senator Helen
Marvin, was a member of the Legislative Commission Committee on AIDS. See LEGISLATIVE
REP., supra note 1, at B-1.
Had the Burgess court found HIV to be covered as a handicap under state law, such discrimina-
tion would not be condoned. While the Communicable Disease Law does not expressly authorize
such action, it reads "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prohibit" these forms of discrimi-
nation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i). Because Burgess held that HIV-infected individuals do not
receive the protection of the handicapped act, there is no law that does prohibit private-sector em-
ployers from requiring HIV tests and basing employment decisions on HIV status. North Carolina
advocates for persons with AIDS, optimistic about the outcome of the Burgess decision, appear to
have underestimated the impact of the new law. See NORTH CAROLINA AIDS SERVICE COALI-
TION, Legislative Update (July 27, 1989) ("[IThe law is silent on these issues .... If there are other
laws that do authorize or prohibit certain things, this new law does not affect them.") While it is
true that the new law does not expressly authorize testing or denial of employment, in the wake of
Burgess, it virtually invites employers to do so.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i). There is no right to a jury trial, and attorney's fees may
be awarded at the discretion of the court. Id. The cause of action granted by the statute has a three
month statute of limitations. Id.
32. Id. Raytheon Co. v. Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1989), illustrates the inappropriateness of such a remedy and the failure of most
existing handicap laws to provide adequate relief. Plaintiff was terminated because of AIDS six
months before he became disabled. The Superior Court decision in his favor came four years after he
filed his complaint and almost three years after his death. Id. at 1091. See Leonard, supra note 5, at
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that could have been earned by the plaintiff.33
Certain employers who are covered by federal law are not affected by the
new North Carolina law. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prohibit discrimination against a person
with AIDS or HIV-infection by any entity that receives federal assistance. In
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline3 4 the Court held that discrimination on
the basis of a communicable disease is prohibited by section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act.35 A teacher, terminated after she suffered a third relapse of tubercu-
losis, brought suit claiming violation of section 504.36 The school district
asserted that Arline was not dismissed because of any disability or handicap, but
because her contagiousness threatened the health of her students.37 The Court
held that a person who is physically disabled by a contagious disease such as
tuberculosis is handicapped within the meaning of section 504 and that employ-
ers may not discriminate against such a person if she is "otherwise qualified" to
perform the job.3 8 In refuting the defendant's claim that the contagiousness
element of a disease may be distinguished from physical impairment, Justice
Brennan wrote for the majority: "It would be unfair to allow an employer to
seize upon the distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the
effects of a disease on the patient and use that distinction to justify discrimina-
tory treatment."'3 9 The Court concluded that contagiousness itself does not ob-
viate the existence of a handicap under the federal act, but expressly declined to
go beyond the case before it to address the question of whether an asymptomatic
HIV-positive individual could be considered handicapped solely because of con-
tagion.40 While Arline did not concern the status of a person with AIDS or
HIV-infection and addressed the issue only in dicta, both commentators and
lower courts have seized upon the Court's language and interpreted .Arline to
941-47 (criticizing inadequacy of approaching AIDS discrimination under traditional handicap the-
ory due to AIDS' progressively debilitating nature).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i).
34. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (7-2 decision).
35. Id. at 285-86. For an interesting article that argues that Arline was wrongly decided and
has been misinterpreted, see Lawson, AIDS, Astrology and Arline: Towards a Causal Interpretation
of Section 504, 17 HoSTRA L. REv. 237 (1989).
36. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 285.
39. Id. at 282.
40. Id. Justice Brennan continued:
The United States argues that it is possible for a person to be simply a carrier of a disease,
that is, to be capable of spreading a disease, without having a "physical impairment" or
suffering from any other symptoms associated with the disease. The United States con-
tends that this is true in the case of some carriers of the [AIDS] virus. From this premise
the United States concludes that discrimination solely on the basis of contagiousness is
never discrimination on the basis of handicap. The argument is misplaced in this case,
because the handicap here, tuberculosis, gave rise both to a physical impairment and to
contagiousness. This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the questions
whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a
physical impairment, or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.
Id. at n.7.
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include persons with HIV or AIDS within the coverage of the federal act.41
In 1988 Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which qualified
the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with handicaps."'42
For the purposes of sections [503] and [504],... as such sections relate
to employment, [the term "individual with handicaps"] does not in-
clude an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection
and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by
reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to
perform the duties of the job.4 3
The provision codified the Arline Court's interpretation of the "otherwise quali-
fied" standard.44 The legislative history of the amendment indicates that its pur-
pose was to "assure employers that they are not required to hire or retain
individuals with contagious diseases or infections who pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of others or who cannot perform the duties of a job."45 The
exclusionary provision implies that persons who do not fall within the specified
grounds for exclusion are covered by section 504.46 It also makes clear that a
direct threat to others or inability to perform the job, and not contagion alone, is
required to justify exclusion from the federal act's protection. 47
In 1988 the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel prepared and
delivered to counsel of the President an opinion on the scope of the antidis-
crimination provisions of the federal Rehabilitation Act.48 The opinion ad-
41. See e'g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 708 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding indi-
vidual with AIDS covered by § 504 in light of Arline); Jones & Sheppard, AIDS and Disability
Employment Discrimination in and beyond the Classroom, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 103, 110-11 (1989);
Turk, AIDS. The First Decade, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 531, 532-42 (1989); Note, AIDS and Em-
ployment Discrimination.: Employer Guidelines and Defenses-School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 23 WAKE FoREsr L. Rv. 305, 305-10 (1988); Comment, The Application of Handicap
Discrimination Laws to AIDS Patients, 22 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 317, 325-27 (1988). But see Lawson, supra
note 35 (arguing for a narrow interpretation of Arline).
42. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32 (1988) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(C) (1989)). The Civil Rights Restoration Act amending § 504 was sponsored jointly by
Senators Harkin and Humphrey and sometimes is referred to as the Harkin-Humphrey amendment.
See D. Kmiec, Memorandum for Counsel to the President on the Application of § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act to HIV-infected Individuals, at 4 (September 27, 1988) (author was Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) [hereinafter Kmiec Opinion].
43. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C) (1989).
44. Kmiec Opinion, supra note 42, at 16 ("In our judgment, this qualification merely codifies
the 'otherwise qualified' standard discussed by the Court in Arline ... including the provision of a
means of reasonable accommodation that can eliminate the health or safety threat or enable the
employee to perform the duties of the job."). The Restoration Act is ambiguous as to whether its
"constitute[s] a direct threat" standard replaces Arline's standard of "significant risk" of workplace
transmission. See Leonard, supra note 5, at 937.
45. See 134 CONG. Rc. H1065 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (colloquy between sponsors of bill).
The basic manner in which an individual with a contagious disease or infection can present
a direct threat to the health or safety of others is when the individual poses a significant
risk of transmitting the contagious disease or infection to other individuals. The Supreme
Court in Arline explicitly recognized this necessary limitation in the protections of section
504. The amendment is consistent with this standard.
Id. Further legislative history is discussed in the Kmiec Opinion, supra note 42, at 19-20.





dressed whether persons with AIDS are protected, despite AIDS' status as a
contagious disease, and whether asymptomatic HIV-infected persons also are
protected. The Department of Justice answered both questions in the affirma-
tive: the first by reference to the Supreme Court's holding in Arline,49 and the
second based on medical clarification from the Surgeon General that even
asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are, from a medical standpoint, physi-
cally impaired.50 The Surgeon General had reported:
[Miuch has been learned about HIV infection that makes it inappro-
priate to think of it as composed of discrete conditions such as ARC
[AIDS related complex] or "full blown AIDS." HIV infection is the
starting point of a single disease which progresses through a variable
range of stages. In addition to an acute flu-like illness, early stages of
the disease may involve subclinical manifestations i.e., impairments
and no visible signs of illness. The overwhelming majority of infected
persons exhibit detectable abnormalities of the immune system. Al-
most all HIV infected persons will go on to develop more serious mani-
festations of the disease and our present knowledge suggests that all
will die of HIV infection barring premature death from other causes.
Accordingly, from a purely scientific perspective, persons with
HIV infection are clearly impaired. They are not comparable to an
immune carrier of a contagious disease such as Hepatitis B. Like a
person in the early stages of cancer, they may appear outwardly
healthy but are in fact seriously ill.51
The Department of Justice concluded that "all HIV-infected individuals who are
not a direct threat to the health or safety of others and are able to perform the
duties of their job are covered by section 504.1'52
While federal law thus provides extensive protection for HIV-infected per-
sons who are otherwise qualified, only state legislation restricts employers who
are not within the coverage of section 504 because they do not receive federal
funds.53 Most states have declared AIDS a disability or handicap for purposes
49. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
50. Kmiec Opinion, supra note 42, at 8 (citing Koop Letter, supra note 30).
51. Koop Letter, supra note 30.
52. Kmiec Opinion, supra note 42, at 18 (1988).
53. See supra notes 9-10 (scope of § 504's coverage). In Raytheon Co. v. Fair Empl. & Hous.
Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1989), a California appeals court
rejected the argument that the federal Rehabilitation Act preempts state legislation in the field of
handicap discrimination, holding that Congress expressly intended that employment discrimination
remedies overlap and parallel. Id. at 1100.
Federal preemption of handicap law; remains a possibility. The Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA), S.B. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S10954 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1989),
which has passed the United States Senate and is now pending before the United States House of
Representatives, would provide broad nondiscrimination protection for disabled persons in the pri-
vate sector, covering employment, public services, public accommodations, transportation, and tele-
ebmmunications. Although many of the concepts used in the ADA originated in § 504
jurisprudence, the two differ in one important regard: while § 504 restricts only employers who
receive federal financial assistance, the ADA would cover the private-sector.
For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the ADA, see The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA): A Comparison and Analysis of the Bill as Introduced and as Passed by the Senate, C.R.S.
REP. No. 89-544A (Sept. 27, 1989); The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): An Overview of
Selected Major Legal Issues, C.R.S. REP. No. 89-433A (July 25, 1989); The Americans with Disabii-
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of prohibiting discrimination under state law;5 4 others have enacted AIDS-spe-
cific legislation.55 In a 1985 article discussing state laws prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of handicap or disability, Professor Leonard
observed that "[tihe initial determinations of administrators on this issue have
been unanimous in finding AIDS to be a covered condition."'5 6 While that ob-
servation may have been true in 1985, since then a number of states have ex-
cluded AIDS and its related conditions from their handicap statutes.5 7 Like
North Carolina, many states and municipalities have instead promulgated
AIDS-specific legislation, sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing the
legal protections offered to persons with AIDS and HIV-infection.5 8 Whether
AIDS is to be classified and protected as a handicap under state law has been a
hotly debated question,5 9 and today the answer varies from state to state. In
North Carolina, the answer is clearly "no."
North Carolina long has adhered to the common-law doctrine of "employ-
ment-at-will" which provides that unless a definite term of employment is speci-
fied, a contract between an employer and employee may be terminated by either
party for any reason or no reason at all.6° However, this common-law doctrine
has been modified by a number of statutory enactments based on public policy, 61
ties Act (ADA): Legal Analysis of Proposed Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, C.R.S. REP. No. 88-621A (Sept. 19, 1988).
Although discussion of the ADA is beyond the scope of this Note, persons with AIDS and
HIV-infection clearly would be covered by its protections if it is enacted as passed by the Senate.
Therefore, its potential impact on the state of the law ought to be anticipated. See Leonard, supra
note 5, at 929-64 (discussing need for national AIDS discrimination legislation due to failure of
states to adequately protect victims); Gaynor, Executive Action Against AIDS: A Proposal for Fed-
eral Regulation Under Existing Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 999 (1989) (discussing various alternative
solutions); Hollowell & Eldridge, Subsistence, Equal Opportunity and the Individual Diagnosed with
HIV, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 561 (1989) (calling for a comprehensive federal AIDS antidiscrimination
law).
54. See Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS--Legislative and Regulatory Pol-
icy in the United States, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621 (1989) (in 34 states the courts, human rights commis-
sions or attorneys general have formally or informally declared that handicap laws apply to AIDS or
HIV-infected individuals); see, e-g., Shuttleworth v. Broward Co., 639 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (discussing administrative opinion holding employment discrimination against person with
AIDS a violation of state handicap law); Raytheon Co. v. Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1100 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1989) (AIDS and HIV-infection protected
handicap under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act); Cronan v. New England Tel. Co.,
41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1275 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986) (AIDS found to be handicap
under state law because of "potential to contract other illnesses" and "an employer's erroneous
perception of him as someone who is contagious to co-workers"). See generally Lewis, Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome: State Legislative Activity, 258 J. A.M.A. 2410, 2410-14 (1987) (sum-
mary of state AIDS legislation); Gostin, supra, at 1622-29 (summary of state AIDS legislation),
55. See infra note 99.
56. Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HoFSrRA L. REv. 11, 21 (1985) (em-
phasis added).
57. See supra note 12.
58. See infra note 99.
59. See, eg., Note, Are AIDS Victims Handicapped?, 31 ST. LOuiS U.L.J. 729 (1987); Note,
AIDS and Employment Discrimination:" Should AIDS Be Considered a Handicap?, 33 WAYNE L.
REv. 1095 (1987); Comment, The Application of Handicap Discrimination Laws to AIDS Patients, 22
U.S.F. L. REv. 317 (1988).
60. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 80, 221 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1976).
61. The federal act obviously overrides the common law employment-at-will doctrine. One
North Carolina judicially-created public policy exception to the common-law doctrine is that a per-
son may not be discharged for refusal to commit an illegal act. See, eg., Coman v. Thomas Mfg.
1202 [Vol. 68
EMPLOYMENT LAW
including both the Federal Rehabilitation Act and the state handicap act. The
doctrine of employment-at-will also ig limited to some extent by the recently
enacted AIDS-specific antidiscrimination provisions in the Communicable Dis-
ease Law. Until recently, however, the status under the North Carolina Handi-
capped Persons Protection Act of persons with AIDS or HIV-infection was
uncertain. In Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc. 62 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that the state handicap act does not protect those persons.
Burgess, a short order cook, was fired when his employer learned that he had
tested positive for HIV.63 Plaintiff sued under the North Carolina Handicapped
Persons Protection Act.64 The trial court dismissed, holding that an asymptom-
atic HIV-carrier is not handicapped within the meaning of the statute.65 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina granted discretionary review ex mero motu.
6 6
Plaintiff urged the court to look to federal courts' interpretations of "handi-
cap" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,67 upon which the
North Carolina act was patterned.68 While acknowledging that the statutes are
"virtually identical," the Burgess court pointed out two significant differences in
the two statutes. First, the North Carolina act's definition of "major life activi-
ties" 69 is more limited, and, second, the state act contains a communicable dis-
ease exemption 70 not found in the federal act. Both the federal act and the
North Carolina act define "handicapped person" as one who has a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more "major life activi-
ties."' 7 1 The sole difference between the two acts is the definition of "major life
Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989) (employee wrongfully terminated for refusal to falsify
records).
62. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
63. Id. at 207, 388 S.E.2d at 135. It was undisputed that the sole reason for plaintiff's termina-
tion was his status as HIV-positive. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 208, 388 S.E.2d at 136.
66. Id. The supreme court granted discretionary review voluntarily, bypassing the appellate
court, without being requested to do so, pursuant to its statutory authority. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-27(a) (1987); see BLAcK's LAW DIcTIOcARY 516 (5th ed. 1979).
67. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 211, 388 S.E.2d at 138; see School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987) (communicable diseases are covered under § 504) (discussed supra notes 34-41
and accompanying text); Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (AIDS
covered by § 504); Ray v. School Bd. of Desoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1529 (M.D. Fla. 1987)
(same); Doe v. Dolton Elem. School Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440,444 (N.D. IIi. 1988) (same); Local 1812
v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (same).
The plaintiff also cited the Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel's interpretation of the federal
act. See Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 10, Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C.
205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1980) (No. 235PA89) and supra text accompanying notes 48-52; Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (asymptomatic HIV-infec-
tion a covered handicap under § 504).
68. See Burgess, 326 N.C. at 211, 388 S.E.2d at 138.
69. See supra note 17.
70. North Carolina General Statutes § 168A-5(b) (1987) provides in part: "It is not a discrimi-
natory action for an employer.., to discharge a handicapped person because the person has a
communicable disease which would disqualify a non-handicapped person from similar employment
...." Section 130A-133(1) defines communicable disease as "an illness due to an infectious agent or
its toxic products which is transmitted directly or indirectly to a person from an infected person or
animal through the agency of an intermediate animal, host or vector, or through the inanimate
environment." See infra note 94.
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(9)(a); supra note 29; 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii). To receive
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activities." The North Carolina act defines the term as "functions such as caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, and learning." 72 The federal definition contains a single additional
word - "working"- in its list of major life activities.73
The plaintiff in Burgess contended that his seropositivity status was the re-
sult of a physical impairment that affected his hemic and lymphatic systems and
prevented him from continuing his employment, thus qualifying him as a handi-
capped person. 74 The court found it significant that the drafters of the North
Carolina act had specifically removed the term "working" from the language of
the senate bill as it was originally drafted.7 5 The court observed:
The specific exclusion of "working" from this list is significant because
it is the only activity listed by the federal act that was not included in
our state act. As this Court has recognized, 'by modifying the lan-
guage borrowed from [a] federal act, the North Carolina legislature
must have intended to alter its meaning to some extent.' The deletion
of the term "working" is some indication that the General Assembly
intended for the Handicapped Persons Act to be more narrow in scope
than its federal counterpart.7 6
Plaintiff contended that the state list of major life activities, like the federal list,
was illustrative rather than exhaustive,77 and cited his inability to have a healthy
child or to engage in sexual relationships. The court rejected plaintiff's argu-
ment and held that these limitations "are not of the same nature as those listed
in the statute, that is, essential tasks one must perform on a regular basis to
carry on a normal existence."7 8 Because the plaintiff failed to show that his
protection under either the state or federal act, a person must prove not only that he is handicapped
but also that he is a "qualified handicapped person." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(4)(b).
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1987).
74. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139.
75. Id. at 213, 388 S.E.2d at 139 (citing S.B. 272, Comm. Substitute (adopted May 30, 1985)).
76. Id. (quoting State ex rel Edmisten v. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 316, 233 S.E. 2d 895, 898
(1977)).
77. Id. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139. Plaintiff cited the Kmiec Opinion, supra note 42, which
described the federal act's list of major life activities (which includes working) as "illustrative and
not exhaustive" and "a helpful starting point for.., analysis." See Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief
at 10-11, Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990) (No.
235PA89). The Kmiec Opinion continued:
We would expect that courts will resolve the factual question whether the impairment of
HIV infection limits a major life activity by reviewing this list for guidance in ascertaining
whether a particular activity constitutes a basic function of life comparable to those on the
list ....
... Since the regulatory list was not intended as an exhaustive one, we believe at least
some courts would find a number of other equally important matters to be directly
affected....
... [W]e believe that it is reasonable to conclude that the life activity of procreation
... is substantially limited for an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual.... Because of
the infection in their system, they will be unable to fulfill this basic human desire. There is
little doubt that procreation is a major life activity ... "
Kmiec Opinion, supra note 42, at 9-11.
78. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139. But see supra note 77. "Working," however,
would appear to meet the court's description of the category. The court did not expressly reject
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condition substantially limited his ability to perform any of the tasks specifically
listed in the North Carolina act, the court concluded that he was not a handi-
capped person under the act.79
The court found a second feature to distinguish the North Carolina act
from its federal counterpart: the state handicap law contains a communicable
disease exemption,80 which allows an employer to terminate a handicapped em-
ployee who has a communicable disease. The statute provides that the employer
is exempt from compliance with the handicapped act if "the person has a com-
municable disease which would disqualify a non-handicapped person from simi-
lar employment."8 1 The court reasoned as follows:
The exemption means that the existence of a communicable disease is
to be treated as a basis for exemption from the application of the act if
it would disqualify a non-handicapped person. The person suffering
from the communicable disease must have an additional disability
which qualifies as a handicap....
... [Tihe legislature did not intend for a communicable condition
itself to be a protected handicap because such an interpretation would
render the communicable disease exemption meaningless.8 2
The court's interpretation of the communicable disease exemption is signifi-
cant because it suggests that not only asymptomatic HIV-carriers but also per-
sons with "full-blown AIDS" are exempted from the protection of the North
Carolina act. Because of North Carolina's more restricted definition of handi-
capped person, and because of the state statute's exemption of communicable
diseases, the Burgess court refused to be guided by federal decisions holding that
AIDS and HIV-infection constitute a protected handicap.
The court bolstered its interpretation of the statutory language by referring
to the legislative history of the recently enacted amendments to the Communica-
ble Disease Law.8 3 The court traced North Carolina's past efforts to enact
AIDS-specific antidiscrimination legislation.8 4 Those efforts included the Sen-
ate's rejection of an antidiscrimination provision specifically designed to protect
HIV-infected persons and an amendment to the Handicapped Persons Act that
would have included communicable diseases in its definition of handicap and
plaintiff's argument that the list was illustrative rather than exhaustive, but declined to imply a term
that the legislature specifically had deleted. See Burgess, 326 N.C. at 213-14, 388 S.E.2d at 139.
79. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 140.
80. See supra note 70. Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee also exempt communicable diseases
from handicap protection. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(c) (Supp. 1987) ("'Handicap' does
not include any disease or condition which is infectious, contagious or similarly transmittable to
other persons."); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(b)(2) (1988) (communicable disease exemp-
tion); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.140(2)(C) (Baldwin 1981) (same).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-5(b)(3) (1987).
82. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 215-16, 388 S.E.2d at 140.
83. See Burgess, 326 N.C. at 218, 388 S.E.2d at 141-42 (discussing legislative history of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130A-148 (1989)). "Courts may use subsequent enactments or amendments as an aid
in arriving at the meaning of a prior statute by utilizing the natural inferences arising out of the
legislative history as it continues to evolve." Id. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Jolly v. Wright,
300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 548 (1980)).
84. See id. at 217-18, 388 S.E.2d at 141-42.
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repealed the communicable disease exemption."5 The court resolved that "[tihis
legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly specifically ad-
dressed the particular question at issue here and affirmatively chose not to in-
clude persons infected with HIV within the scope of the Handicapped Persons
Act."'86 The supreme court concluded that "both the plain language of its provi-
sions and the legislative history surrounding it indicate that the legislature did
not intend to protect persons infected with HIV" under the Handicapped Per-
sons Protection Act.8 7 The court described the new communicable disease law,
although enacted too late to help plaintiff Burgess,88 as "a specific, comprehen-
sive declaration of the extent to which AIDS infection may affect employment
decisions."'8 9
Any analysis of the new legislation must be in the context of the Burgess
ruling and the General Assembly's past attempts to legislate on AIDS/HIV dis-
crimination. 90 A recurring but unanswered question is why the legislature de-
clined to include AIDS and HIV-infection within the North Carolina handicap
act. 91 Indeed, the legislature appears to have performed semantic gymnastics to
exclude AIDS and HIV-infection from coverage under the act.92 The only ap-
85. Id. at 217, 388 S.E.2d at 141.
86. Id. at 217, 388 S.E.2d at 141-42. Plaintiff's brief emphasized that the amendments to the
Communicable Disease Act are under the subsection "Laboratory Tests for AIDS Virus Infection"
and the section deals largely with standards for tests of blood, tissue, semen or organs for HIV.
Plaintiff-Appellant's New Reply Brief at 1-2, Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205,
388 S.E.2d 134 (1990) (No. 235PA89). Rather than a statute intended to alter the handicap law, the
plaintiff argued, this law is a public health statute; its provisions on discrimination should be inter-
preted as a supplement to the handicap act rather than an abridgment, because the handicap statute
does not apply to employers of fewer than fifteen employees. Id. at 2. The plaintiff cited treatises
and cases for the proposition that when statutes are capable of consistent construction, both ought to
be given effect. Id. at 3 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("courts are not at
liberty to pick and choose [among statutes]")). Because both statutes can be read to prohibit dis-
charge of HIV-infected individuals, the plaintiff reasoned, the statutes may be construed in harmony.
Id. at 4.
87. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 209, 388 S.E.2d at 137.
88. The court's observation that "[a]s of the filing of plaintiff's complaint and the entry of the
order of dismissal, the statutory protections now being afforded simply did not exist" suggested that
with different timing Burgess would have been protected from discrimination under the new legisla.
tion. But, as the court also noted, the statute specifically exempts restaurants from compliance until
July, 1991; had the statute been in force it would have been of no use to Burgess, a short-order cook.
North Carolina law currently provides no protection for plaintiffs like Burgess. See infra note 105.
89. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 218, 388 S.E.2d at 142.
90. House Bill 458 would have amended the Communicable Disease Law as follows: "Except
as provided in subsection (h), no test or test result for AIDS virus infection shall be required, per-
formed or utilized to determine suitability for employment, housing or public services, or for the use
of public places of public accommodation... or public transportation." H.B. 458, 1987 General
Assembly, 1st Sess. § 16(f) (May 19, 1987). This broad antidiscrimination provision would have
prohibited completely discrimination and testing in employment. The proposal passed the House
but was deleted by a Senate subcommittee, which substituted another provision that would have
amended the Handicapped Persons Act to include coverage of communicable diseases or conditions,
thereby repealing the communicable disease exemption. H.B. 458, 1987 General Assembly, 2d Sess.,
§ 16(h), Senate Comm. Substitute Bill (adopted July 30, 1987). In the end, neither provision was
adopted. See Burgess, 326 N.C. at 217-18, 388 S.E.2d at 141-42.
91. "In the present period of speculation and concern over the incurable and fatal nature of
AIDS there is no doubt that a known carrier of the virus which causes it is perceived to be handi-
capped." Local 1812 v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987).
92. The Burgess court did some gymnastics of its own, reasoning:
If one removes the words 'communicable disease' in the provision and replaces them with
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parent reason for the legislative deletion of "working" from the North Carolina
act's definition of major life activities is to expressly exclude coverage of impair-
ments that do not affect basic physical functions but do result in employment
termination. This would appear to authorize employment discrimination based
on perceived handicaps, which is expressly protected by the handicapped act.93
There is likewise no apparent justification for the handicap act's communi-
cable disease exemption. By exempting communicable diseases from coverage as
handicaps, the legislature only could have intended to exclude AIDS and HIV-
infection from coverage. 94 Any other purpose sought to be served through the
exclusion, such as protection of other employees or the public, is already
achieved under both the federal and state statutes, which protect only "quali-
fied" handicapped individuals from discrimination. 95 As noted by the Depart-
ment of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, "the consideration of the 'otherwise
qualified' standard allows for a reasonable determination of whether contagious-
ness threatens the health or safety of others or job performance, and in those
events, permits the exclusion of the individual."' 96 A communicable disease ex-
emption is therefore unnecessary to protect either the health and safety of the
workplace or the productivity of the employee. 97
the word 'handicap,' so that the exemption reads, '[i]t is not a discriminatory action for an
employer.., to discharge a handicapped person because the person has a [handicap] which
would disqualify a non-handicapped person from similar employment,' the provision
would make no sense, because one cannot, by definition, simultaneously be both handi-
capped and non-handicapped.
Burgess, 326 N.C. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at 140-41.
93. See supra note 17 (definition of handicapped under state act).
94. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the communicable disease exemption was
added in 1987, at the height of public and governmental ignorance and hysteria over the AIDS
epidemic. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), discussed supra notes
34-41 and accompanying text, the United States Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioner's argu-
ment that in defining a handicapped individual, the contagious effects of the disease could be mean-
ingfully distinguished from the disease's effects on the claimant. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282. Yet that
appears precisely to be the intent and the result of the North Carolina communicable disease
exemption.
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). In Raytheon v. Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1989), a California appeals court noted that under California law,
the communicability of the disease does not affect the determination of whether a handicap exists,
but instead is considered when evaluating the reasonableness of the discriminatory action taken by
the employer, a burden the employer must carry. Id. at 1091. If the employee is a significant risk to
co-workers or the public, he is not qualified. See also Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Homes,
831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987) (§ 504 claim denied because employee was disabled by AIDS and
unable to work, therefore, not otherwise qualified).
96. Kmiec Opinion, supra note 42, at 6. The Supreme Court said in Arline that "[a] person
who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will
not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that
risk." 480 U.S. at 287 n.16 (1987). The contagiousness of a person should be used to determine
whether the employer is justified in action taken concerning the handicapped employee; it does not
make the employee's condition any less a handicap.
97. There are, of course, other employer interests that are protected by a communicable disease
exemption, including higher health costs and lower productivity, as well as coworker aversion to
working with the infected employee. Courts have consistently rejected these types of employer inter-
ests as justification for discrimination against handicapped employees. See Wegner, supra note 9, at
448-51 (describing policy decision to reject cost as justification for handicap discrimination). Never-
theless, it is likely that the vociferous advocacy of the employers' lobbyists in the state capital was
somewhat motivated by these interests.
The federal act's "otherwise qualified" standard requires an employer not only to hire a quali-
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The joint efforts of the legislature and the supreme court have succeeded in
barring HIV-infected individuals, and apparently those with full-blown AIDS,
from protection as a handicap under state law. That leaves HIV-infected indi-
viduals with only the coverage of the new AIDS-specific law. Although the
Communicable Disease Law appears to protect adequately the rights of those
infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS with regard to housing, public serv-
ices, public accommodation and transportation, it is virtually an invitation to
discriminate in the area of employment.98
The Communicable Disease Law's provisions for workplace testing and em-
ployment decisions based on HIV status are problematic in several ways. The
North Carolina legislation clearly represents a minority approach; some state
legislatures have acted to prohibit completely the use of blood tests for any pur-
pose related to employment;99 and others prohibit employers from taking any
action based on an employee's actual or suspected HIV status.100 Likewise, fed-
eral law prohibits pre-employment inquiries as to whether an applicant is handi-
capped.101 In contrast, the North Carolina statute authorizes testing of both job
applicants and current employees, regardless of the type of job or the risk level
of the person to be tested. 102 Current medical findings are unanimous in their
conclusion that such testing of the general population is unnecessary. 10 3 The
consensus of the medical and scientific community is that AIDS is not transmit-
fled handicapped person, but also to make reasonable accommodations to eliminate any health threat
or inability to perform the job. 45 C.F.RL § 84.3(k)(1) (1987) (" 'qualified handicapped person'
means... [w]ith respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the job in question"); see also Kmiec Opinion, supra note
42, at 21-28 (discussing Harkins-Humphrey amendment to § 504 regarding requirement of reason-
able accommodation).
98. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
99. See, eg., Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West Supp. 1987) (employers may not require or
solicit AIDS test from applicants or employees and may not base employment terms on HIV status
unless state officials declare transmission through employment to be a significant risk); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 19204-B (Supp. 1987) (unlawful to solicit or require AIDS test as a condition of
employment); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70F (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (unlawful to solicit or
require AIDS test as a condition of employment).
A number of municipalities have also enacted regulations limiting the use of AIDS testing in the
employment context. See AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE 31-185 (BNA 1987) (Austin, Texas Code § 7-
4-120-133 (1986) (no person shall require another to undergo any medical procedure or test designed
to show or help show whether a person has AIDS or is a HIV-infected individual unless such testing
is necessary as a bona fide occupational qualification); Boston, Mass. Mayoral Executive Order of
March 6, 1987 (affirming city's commitment to state law that employers prohibited from requiring
HIV-antibody tests as a condition of initial or continuing employment)). See generally 1 L. LARSON
& P. BROWSKY, UNJUST DiSMssAL, § 7.07[2] (1988) (discussing AIDS testing).
100. See supra note 99.
101. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1989).
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i)(1) and (3) (1989).
103. The opinion of the United States Department of Health and Human Services is that there is
no need for routine AIDS testing. See W. BANrA, supra note 6, at 95. The United States Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) has said that employment testing is not necessary because AIDS is not
transmissible in the workplace, including restaurants and hospitals. See CDC Recommendations for
Preventing AIDS Transmission in the Workplace, reprinted in W. BANTA, supra note 6, at 159-69
[hereinafter CDC Guidelines]. The CDC also has found that employment testing discourages people
from seeking counseling and testing and thus interferes with efforts to combat the spread of AIDS,
W. BANTA, supra note 6, at 95. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop also thinks mandatory
testing not wise, since those who need treatment are likely to avoid testing. Id.
In contrast, a 1987 poll showed that 37% of the American public believes that all job applicants
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ted by casual contact; blood, tissue and genital secretions are the only known
vehicles of transmission. 104 Except for a few possible situations, for example
where an employee's job requires him to be in contact with body fluids, 10 5 most
employers have no need to know whether employees are HIV-positive, and
therefore pre-employment and routine employment testing serve no good
purpose.
Furthermore, current testing technology may be inappropriate for mass
screening. Testing for the HIV-infection is accomplished most commonly
through testing for antibodies by a test known as ELISA.10 6 The ELISA test
has a number of shortcomings, as reported to the General Assembly by the
North Carolina Legislative Research Commission:
Importantly, this test was not developed for diagnositc [sic] purposes,
but rather as a tool to screen units of blood being used for transfusion.
This test may cost as much as $20 to $60 depending on where it is
performed. No antibody test is perfect, and the HIV ELISA test has
shortcomings. About 1 in every 100 normal persons will react falsely
with this test. Thus, the odds of a positive test correctly indicating the
presence of HIV infection will vary with the proportion of persons be-
ing tested who really are infected. For example, suppose the ELISA
test is used to screen 1000 persons, of whom only one truly has HIV
should be tested; 34% believe present employees should be tested and 52% believe that everyone
should be tested. Id. at 97.
104. HIV-infection is only known to be transmitted through sexual contact, the sharing of con-
taminated needles, contaminated blood and blood products, infected organ or tissue transplants, and
from mother to infant across the placenta. CDC Guidelines, supra note 103, at 10 (no known risk of
transmission to co-workers, clients or consumers exists from infected workers in offices, schools,
factories, construction sites or food service); Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1125-33 (1987).
There is no known risk of non-sexual infection in most of the situations we encounter in
our daily lives. We know that family members living with individuals who have the AIDS
virus do not become infected except through sexual contact. There is no evidence of trans-
mission (spread) of AIDS virus by everyday contact even though these family members
shared food, towels, cups, razors, even toothbrushes, and kissed each other.
Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, at 13
(1986)).
105. The United States Centers for Disease Control has taken the position that even testing of
health care and restaurant workers is not necessary. CDC Guidelines, supra note 103, at 10.
All epidemiologic and laboratory evidence indicates that blood-borne and sexually trans-
mitted infections are not transmitted during the preparation or serving of food or bever-
ages, and no instances of [HIV infection have been documented in this setting....
Routine seriologic testing of [food-service workers] for antibody [to HMI] is not rec-
ommended to prevent disease transmission... to consumers.
Id. at 168. This leads one to question the temporary exemption of restaurants from the Communica-
ble Disease amendments. Restaurant employers presumably are free to require tests of selected em-
ployees and to terminate employment based on AIDS regardless of confirmation of a test result. The
author of this Note was able to locate no legislative history that suggested any justification for this
temporary exemption. It is clearly unwarranted based on current medical findings and the recom-
mendations of the Centers for Disease Control.
106. The Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay is a screening test. CDC Guidelines, supra note
103, at 1. If the screening result is positive, it is confirmed with a more specific test, usually the
Western blot assay. Id. A positive ELISA result must be confirmed before a positive HIV diagnosis
is given. Id.
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infection. About 11 persons will test positive: 1 true positive, and 10
false positive.... [T]he odds of a positive ELISA test indicating true
infection is about 10% .... This feature of testing needs to be consid-
ered whenever a screening program is considered.10 7
The key to the ELISA test is that its effectiveness as a screening device depends
on the population in which it is used. It is a blunt tool when used in a general
population with a low incidence of HIV-positives. t0 8 Far too many unaffected
people will test positive. In the context of an epidemic as feared and misunder-
stood as AIDS, the ramifications of an excessive number of false positives are
frightening. 10 9
While the North Carolina statute requires a "confirmed positive test"
before an employer may take action based on an HIV blood test, the statute does
not indicate how this test must be confirmed. 110 Contrary to the admonition of
the Legislative Research Commission,111 the North Carolina legislation does not
consider the limitations of current testing technology. The statute also does not
regulate the conditions under which blood tests may be taken or confirmed;'" 2
whether employers or employees must bear the high cost of a required test; or
how results ought to be recorded, filed, or communicated.' 13 Confidentiality
concerns are great in the area of AIDS testing, yet the North Carolina legisla-
ture has authorized testing in the employment context with no provisions for
protecting the privacy of those to be tested, or protecting employers against tort
liability for suits based on privacy and defamation.' 14
Most importantly, there is no test that tells whether a person actually has,
107. LEGISLATIVE REP., supra note 1, at 4-5. The prevalence of HIV-infection in the population
of North Carolina is thought to be about 0.02%; therefore, the probability that an individual who
tests positive is indeed infected is only nine percent. Ninety-one percent of those who test positive
will be false positives. Landis, To Test Or Not To Test, 48 N.C. MED. J. 357, 359-61 (1987) (discuss-
ing high costs and little gains associated with mass screening in the general population). Se. gener-
ally Myers & Myers, Arguments Involving AIDS Testing in the Workplace, 38 LAB. L.J. 582, 585-90
(1987) (arguments for and against testing in workplace).
108. See Landis, supra note 107, at 361.
109. It is difficult to predict a person's reaction to being told he has tested positive for the AIDS
virus, but suicide is not uncommon. See Holzhauer, AIDS Testing in the Health Care Setting, 4
IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 359, 363-65 (1988); Marzuk, Tierney, Tardiff, Gross, Morgan, Hsu &
Mann, Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259 J. A.M.A. 1333 (1988); Glass, AIDS and
Suicide, 259 J. A.M.A. 1369 (1988). For this reason, too, the employment context is inappropriate
for testing. As the law now stands, test results may be communicated to the employer who may
simply tell a job applicant over the telephone that he has tested positive and therefore not a desirable
employee. North Carolina law does not provide for follow-up counselling, psychological or medical
referrals or even an explanation of the significance of a positive test result.
110. Elsewhere the statute provides that the Public Health Commission shall adopt rules estab-
lishing certification of laboratories and that AIDS tests may be performed only by certified laborato-
ries; certification procedures are to include proficiency testing, record maintenance, adequate staffing
and confirmatory testing. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(a) (1989).
111. See supra text accompanying note 107; Landis, supra note 107, at 359.
112. Although laboratories performing tests must be certified, there are no provisions for the
conditions under which blood samples are to be taken, other than that laboratories are to test only
specimens submitted by a licensed physician. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(a) (1989).
113. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
114. See W. BANTA, supra note 6, at 18-24 (discussing possible causes of action against employ-
ers); Holzhauer, supra note 109, at 351-57.
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or may develop, AIDS.' 1 5
The only fact established by the test is whether the person has antibo-
dies to the AIDS virus. A person who recently contracted the virus
but had not yet manufactured antibodies would produce a negative
result. Typically, there is a six- to twelve-week hiatus between devel-
oping the virus and manufacturing the antibodies that can be de-
tected.... No AIDS test... can predict whether a person testing
positive will ever develop AIDS .... 116
In addition, some commentators feel that testing for HIV tends to give rise to a
false sense of security.1 17 Testing in the general employment context serves only
to strengthen the forces of irrationality, ignorance, and fear presently surround-
ing AIDS and HIV-infection, and encourages discrimination rather than protec-
tion and understanding of persons who are already battling a deadly opponent.
The North Carolina legislature has failed to adequately protect the rights of
people with AIDS and HIV-infection. HIV-infected individuals, even those who
are disabled by AIDS, are not protected under the North Carolina Handicapped
Persons Protection Act. The communicable disease exemption will exclude per-
sons who have progressed to the final stages of AIDS, even if they are able to
meet the standard of "qualified handicapped person," thereby posing no threat
to the health or safety of those around them. Persons who are HIV-positive but
asymptomatic, although able to work and not a threat to the health and safety of
those around them, likewise are excluded by this exemption. The federal handi-
cap protection scheme includes those afflictions within its scope to effectively
protect rights in the public-sector. The North Carolina act tracks the language
of the federal statute, with the exception of the communicable disease exemption
and the deletion of "working" from the list of major life activities. 118
These legislative modifications of the federal definition serve the sole pur-
pose of excluding people with AIDS and HIV-infection from the protections
afforded by the handicap act. The narrow reach of employment protections for
victims of AIDS and HIV infection runs counter to the purpose stated by the
General Assembly in the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act:
It was intended to "encourage and enable all handicapped people to participate
115. Tests screen only for the presence of HIV antibodies in the blood. CDC Guidelines, supra
note 103, at 1. "Detectable antibody usually develops within three months after infection. A con-
firmed positive antibody test means that a person is infected with HIV and is capable of transmitting
the virus to others. Although a negative antibody test usually means that a person is not infected,
antibody tests cannot rule out infection from a recent exposure." Id.
116. W. BANTA, supra note 6, at 98.
117. See supra note 115; Holzhauer, supra note 109, at 349-50. Holzhauer argues that routine
testing in a health care setting will result in workers lowering their guard with patients who tested
negative, thus increasing the risk of transmission from what he calls "silent HIV patients," those
who are infected but whose bodies have not yet begun to produce antibodies. Id. at 349. Reliance on
tests rather than precautions to prevent transmission requires constant testing and a more accurate
testing technology than we now possess. Id. at 350; see generally W. BANTA, supra note 6, at 99-105
(arguments for and against workplace testing).
118. It is incongruous that an HIV-infected employee of a North Carolina hospital or university
is legally handicapped, while a similarly infected employee of the private business across the street is
not. While the public employer may not test for HIV before hiring and may not base a decision to
hire on an applicant's HIV status, the private businessman, limited only by the Communicable Dis-
ease Law, may do both. See supra notes 9-10 (scope of § 504).
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fully to the extent of their abilities in the... economic life of the state, [and] to
engage in remunerative employment." '1 19 This policy justification of encourag-
ing the handicapped to work if they are able is equally as compelling where
HIV-positive individuals are concerned. It is impossible to rationalize the legis-
lature's decision to condone, indeed encourage, employers treating job appli-
cants differently from current employees.120 As the United States Supreme
Court observed in Arline:
Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the level of public fear and mis-
apprehension as contagiousness. Even those who suffer or have recov-
ered from such non-infectious disease as epilepsy or cancer have faced
discrimination based on the irrational fear that they might be conta-
gious. The [Rehabilitation] Act is carefully structured to replace such
reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based
on reasoned and medically sound judgments 121
The North Carolina General Assembly appears to have ignored such medi-
cal judgments in shaping its AIDS-related legislation. Laws enacted specifically
to protect the rights of HIV-infected persons excluded from other statutory pro-
tection fall far short of this goal. The Burgess court found the new legislation to
indicate that the legislature preferred to treat AIDS and HIV-infection in a spe-
cific statute, rather than to classify it as a handicap. 122 Justice Meyer, writing
for the court, said that the amendments to the communicable disease law were
the product of extensive efforts to balance the interests of the infected
employee with the concerns, whether legitimate or illusory, of employ-
ers faced with the perceived risk of liability as a result of employing a
person with the HIV virus. 123
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-2(a) (1987). See also id. § 168A-2(b) (discrimination based on
handicap is contrary to the public interest and to the principles of freedom and equality of opportu.
nity); Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 524, 259 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1979) (statute
is remedial and "should be construed liberally, in a manner which assures fulfillment of the beneficial
goals for which it was enacted and which brings with it all cases fairly falling within its intended
scope").
Lack of access to, and the threat of unfair discrimination from, subsistence-related private
interests [such as employment, housing, medical care, education, marriage, travel and mili-
tary service] produces a substantial negative impact upon individual survival. Further-
more, such discrimination also exerts a substantially adverse impact upon the nation's
economy-both in terms of lost labor time, and the contribution that the labor time can
make towards underwriting the costs associated with the AIDS epidemic.
Holowell & Eldridge, supra note 53, at 568.
120. An eventual constitutional challenge based on equal protection grounds is not unlikely.
The legislature appears to have given employers permission to discriminate against job applicants,
but not against current employees. Conversation with William E. Murphy, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, April 24, 1990.
121. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). "Because AIDS' victims
include a high percentage of homosexual men and users of illegal drugs, many consider the disease
the result of illicit conduct, and its victims are isolated not only by others' dread of catching the
deadly disease but also by others' notions of morality." Carey & Arthur, The Developing Law on
AIDS in the Workplace, 46 MD. L. REv. 284,285-86 (1987). See also Raytheon Co. v. Fair Empl. &
Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1091 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1989) (comparing
panic of AIDS epidemic to the internment of Japanese Americans, the polio scare, and fear of cancer
victims).
122. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 218, 388 S.E.2d 134, 142 (1990).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
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Whether the court intended the irony in that statement is uncertain. However,
"illusory" concerns and "perceived" risks are not the stuff of which antidis-
crimination laws are made; they are the evil that this type of statute is meant to
remedy. While the state legislature is to be lauded for the protections it gave
HIV-infected persons under the communicable disease law in housing, public
services, public accommodation and transportation, one wonders why the legis-
lature determined protections against testing and discrimination to be less essen-
tial in the employment context.124 The state handicap legislation was amended
to exclude these victims; the state communicable disease law specifically denies
that its provisions are to be construed so as to prohibit an employer from requir-
ing AIDS tests and denying employment based on HIV-positive status.1 25 The
legislature should return to the drafting table and craft legislation that does ex-
pressly prohibit HIV-testing and hiring decisions based on HIV-status. 126 The
General Assembly has ignored both current medical realities and the findings of
its own research commission. 127 Instead of extinguishing public misinformation
and irrational fears surrounding the AIDS epidemic, it has fanned the flames.
CHRISTYNO L. HAYES
124. One wonders how lIV-positive individuals are expected to take advantage of their pro-
tected access to public transportation and services when they are unable to obtain employment and
support themselves.
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148 (1989).
126. "The use of coercive powers, far from accomplishing the ostensible objective of impeding
the AIDS epidemic, could well fuel it." Gostin, supra note 54, at 1629.
127. "Sound legislative policy on HIV-infection needs to protect the rights of these individuals
and allow them to continue their contribution, instead of becoming a drain on society." LEGIsLA-
TIVE REP., supra note 1, at 9.
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